

Abstract

Combination of the evidence from current literature suggests a possibility to understand the aetiology of delusion from non-deluded individuals. This direction is moreover able to shed light on to what extent the belief mechanism can be generalized across people. In this study, two reasoning biases, jumping to conclusions (JTC) and belief inflexibility (BI), were investigated with conviction of personally meaningful belief and delusion proneness. Forty-five undergraduate students were recruited to receive an interview concerning their personally meaningful belief and BI. The participants then performed two computerised beads tasks and completed a questionnaire measuring delusion proneness. Our results demonstrated that belief conviction was predicted positively by BI as measured by reaction to hypothetical contradiction (RTHC), and negatively by JTC bias while delusion proneness did not differ between individuals who had a JTC bias and those who did not. It is concluded that the association between BI (only one of the two measures) and belief conviction may not be unique to delusion, but is also shown in personally meaningful beliefs. The relationship between JTC and delusion proneness was not consistent with previous findings using different statistical analysis. This may suggest that the effect of JTC on delusion proneness is mild. The implication and application of the result were discussed.

Keywords: personally meaningful belief, reasoning biases, jumping to conclusions, belief inflexibility, delusion proneness